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Introduction
What actions should we, as a subset of world citizenry, 
be contemplating now in response to the likely effects 
of climate change? That is the fundamental question 
posed by the Stern Review. As is the case with most large 
questions, our individual and collective responses are 
conditioned by our systems of values, by the institutions 
within which we work, by uncertainties about the facts 
and by the intellectual frameworks that help structure 
our understanding of reality.
Diverse values and imperfect institutions accepted, our 
immediate needs are for greater clarity and broader 
appreciation of the emerging facts and for continuing 
dialogue on how we should respond to them. The Stern 
Review paints a sombre picture. Energy-related CO
2
 
emissions are now some fi ve times the level prevailing in 
the 1950s, at which point they were roughly in balance 
with the globe’s annual capacity to re-absorb them. 
The resulting build-up in atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations will continue until such time as annual 
emissions are radically reduced, and will cause signifi cant 
lifts in global temperatures, of uncertain extent and 
over a long period. Although warming temperatures 
will have some benefi cial effects, the adverse effects will 
increasingly predominate at higher temperatures.
The Stern team reviews what is known about the 
range and likely scale of such effects and adds its own 
contribution to attempts to model and quantify the 
annual economic impact of climate change over the 
horizon to the year 2200. Faced with the uncertainties 
inherent in forecasting, Stern uses probabilistic 
modelling to assess the range and associated mean values 
for annual damage under several scenarios.
Stern also assesses the possible cost of policies designed 
to reduce levels of greenhouse gas emissions below 
the levels that would prevail under ‘business as usual’ 
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conditions. The review surveys attempts to estimate the 
cost of a wide range of initiatives to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions using available technologies and, assuming 
that these set outer limits on achievable costs, concludes 
that continuing expenditures equal to 1% of global 
GDP have the potential to limit greenhouse gas 
concentrations to acceptable levels.
Stern’s estimates of the costs of climate damage and 
of policies designed to reduce such damage have 
had a mixed reception (e.g. Carter et al., 2006). 
Acknowledging the uncertainties in all such projections, 
and that we are all, Stern and critics included, exposed 
to error and bias, the likely gravity of the emerging 
situation and the long leads and lags in the climate 
system make it imperative to essay such estimates. We 
have a collective interest in building as clear a picture 
as we can of the consequences of failing to act and of 
the costs of action. If we had perfect foreknowledge, we 
would be able to call up the required time series off the 
shelf. Lacking that, we can be grateful that Stern has 
pushed the limits thus far. Accepting these, or more 
refi ned future estimates of the costs of climate damage 
and of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the 
problem is to compare them.
Discounting
The costs of climate change will persist long into the 
future, whilst policies to limit climate change require 
spending now and over coming decades. How do we, 
as individuals and as a community, compare costs 
incurred today with benefi ts (in the form of reduced 
costs) occurring far in the future?
The standard tool is discounting. Working on the 
basis that a given quantum of anything at some point 
in the future is less valuable than the same quantum 
in our hands now, it is usual to discount the value 
of future benefi ts and costs. At what rate should we 
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discount the future? In some situations, as when 
borrowing for house purchase, an obvious rate is 
that at which we borrow. For public investment the 
discount rate is a given, with the rate being set by the 
relevant controlling authority.
The most commonly quoted New Zealand rate for 
public project appraisal is 10%, as prescribed by 
Treasury and by Transfund for roading projects. The 
problem with this rate for assessing policies designed to 
mitigate climate change is that 10% focuses attention 
very much on the near term and effectively ignores the 
longer run.
Using Transfund’s rule, which also limits the time 
horizon to 25 years, a constant stream of benefits 
accruing at $1 million per annum will sum to $9.07 
million. Even if we extend our horizon indefi nitely, 
the discounted benefi ts will never exceed $10 million. 
The 10% rule effectively removes all but a few of the 
costs and benefi ts accruing more than 25 years out 
from consideration and is thus inappropriate, when our 
primary focus is on longer-term issues.
Dissatisfaction with the implications of such high 
discount rates, which were long the international 
norm, has led to signifi cant changes in practice in some 
countries. A leading example is the United Kingdom, 
whose 2002 ‘Green Book’ prescribes a 3.5% discount 
rate for the fi rst 75 years of a project’s life, with declining 
rates thereafter.
The Stern Review’s extensive discussion on discounting, 
which many have interpreted as advocating a radical 
lowering of the discount rate to 0.1%, has caused sharp 
controversy.
Determining a discount rate
Discount rate theory is, in any event, an active and 
contentious fi eld. Any proposed discount rate depends 
on some underlying theoretical structure identifying the 
relevant components and an appeal to empirical evidence 
or to fi rst principles as a guide to their magnitude.
Suppose we have reasonable estimates of the time 
streams of costs and benefi ts associated with proceeding 
down a particular policy path. Then, the net present 
value of that policy path can be assessed as
      (1)
i.e., as the sum of the project benefi ts, b, less the costs, 
c, accumulated over the relevant time period and 
discounted at the rate r (e.g., for a 3% discount rate 
1+r = 1.03).
The discount factor r is variously derived and with some 
variation in symbolism, but the following equation 
brings together the major elements:
        (2)
In this equation  (delta) is a measure of pure time 
preference. We discuss it further below.
The second component, gη , deals with the likelihood 
that per capita consumption will grow over time so that 
future consumption will be relatively plentiful and will 
have lower utility. The fi rst element, η (eta), measures the 
responsiveness of utility to consumption and g measures 
the rate of growth of per capita consumption.
Taken together, these two components, i.e. ( gηδ +
comprise the social time preference rate, which is 
evaluated in the UK Green Book at 3.5%. The social 
time preference rate depends upon the perceived utility of 
consumption at different points in time and is risk-free.
The fi nal component,    , adds risk to the picture. 
The fi rst element,  (phi), measures the price of risk 
(approximated by the difference between some measure 
of average market returns and the risk-free rate), whilst 
 (beta) measures the quantity of risk, usually measured 
as the likely variability, and hence riskiness, of the 
contemplated investment type, expressed relative to the 
variability and riskiness of a wider reference market.
Taken as a whole, equation 2 provides one measure 
of the social opportunity cost of capital (often further 
extended to take account of tax impacts), which stands 
as a competing discounting norm to the rate of social 
time preference. The appeal of the opportunity cost 
measure is that it focuses on the returns that might be 
secured from investing a block of funds in the private 
marketplace rather than in a particular public project. 
Critics of this approach, who argue for use of the 
alternative, social time preference rate, note that the risks 
surrounding public sector projects are fundamentally 
different from those embodied in equity markets 
(Spackman, 2004; Quiggin, 2005) and that in an open 
international economy the opportunity cost of public 
investments can be approximated by the real cost of 
public borrowing (Lind, 1990).
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In my view, risk is generally better modelled, within 
public sector project appraisal, as an element within 
the cost and benefi t streams than as an add-on within 
the discount rate. For our purposes, we can leave that 
issue aside. The questions raised by the Stern Review 
relate to pure time preference,δ , and the social time 
preference rate, )( gηδ + .
Discount rates in the Stern Review
Chapter 2 of the Stern Review, a technical annex and 
supporting papers by John Broome and Cameron 
Hepburn, deal with discounting. The authors argue that 
whilst standard cost-benefi t appraisals are appropriate for 
analysing marginal projects within stable frameworks, 
they are inappropriate for comparison of very different 
economic trajectories involving very long-term and 
large inter-generational impacts, such as are involved 
in contemplating climate change.
For example, as we have seen, the social time preference 
rate, )( gηδ + , is itself a function of the rate of growth 
in per capita consumption, g. If we are comparing 
long-run scenarios in which the rate of growth in 
consumption is itself sensitive to climatic outcomes, 
then the appropriate discount rate is scenario specifi c. 
Furthermore, stable discount rates are predicated on 
stable future growth paths. If we expect the rate of 
growth in consumption to vary through time, then the 
appropriate discount rate will depend on the time period 
chosen. Declining per capita consumption could even 
lead to negative discount rates. Uncertainty about future 
growth paths also creates a case for discount rates that 
decline through time.
More fundamentally, the authors ask what are the ethical 
bases on which we make judgements about the welfare 
of distant generations. Drawing on the reasoning of a 
long line of writers, including Ramsey, Pigou and Solow, 
they argue that we have very little basis for valuing the 
welfare of future generations as inherently different from 
that of our own:
the current generation does not have the right 
to consume or damage the environment and the 
planet in a way that gives its successor worse life 
chances than it itself enjoyed,
and conclude that
the only sound ethical basis for placing less value 
on the utility [as opposed to consumption] of 
future generations [is] the uncertainty over 
whether or not the world will exist, or whether 
those generations will all be present. (Stern, 
pp.42, 45)
Quantifi cation of the uncertainty of the future existence 
of the human race is not simple, but Stern argues that 
a value of 0.1% is appropriate for δ , the parameter 
dealing with pure time preference. Recall that this is only 
one element within the social rate of time preference. 
The authors emphasise that using a low value for δ does 
not imply a low discount rate: ‘Growing consumption 
is a reason for discounting’ (Stern, p.48).
It is at this point that confusion has arisen. Much of the 
review’s algebra does indeed suggest that δ  is used as 
the discount rate, rather than as just one component in 
determining that rate (e.g., Stern, Box 6.3). However that 
may be, material subsequently posted on the UK Treasury 
website, including the January 2007 paper ‘Frequently 
asked questions’, reports that the discount rate used in 
the modelling exercise is sensitive to the rate of growth 
in per capita consumption and the marginal utility of 
consumption. Documentation for the PAGE2002 model 
that was used for the cost of climate damage scenarios 
shows that the default discount rate equation is similarly 
comprehensive (Alberth and Hope, 2005, p.15).
On this basis, it would appear that the discount rate 
used by Stern to convert future time streams of climate 
costs to present values was around 1.4%. Recalling our 
social time preference rate equation, gηδρ += , we 
have 1.0=δ , 0.1=η , and 3.1=g  (which is the average 
per capita consumption growth rate as per PAGE2002’s 
baseline projection as given in Stern’s Box 6.3). That 
is, we have 0.1+1.0*1.3=1.4%. By way of contrast, 
the UK Green Book uses 5.1=δ  (covering both pure 
time preference and risk of catastrophe), 0.1=η , and 
0.2=g , leading to a discount rate of 3.5%. Quite 
clearly we are dealing with uncertain parameters and the 
Stern Review could usefully have reported the sensitivity 
of its results to variation in discount rates.
Cost scenarios in the Stern Review
Part II of the Stern Review assesses the impacts of climate 
change on growth and development and estimates 
the likely economic costs associated with temperature 
increases resulting from increases in greenhouse gas 
concentrations.
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Modelling work undertaken by the review 
suggests that the risks and costs of climate change 
over the next two centuries could be equivalent 
to an average reduction in global per capita 
consumption of at least 5% now and forever. 
The estimated damages would be much higher 
if non-market impacts, the possibility of greater 
climate sensitivity, and distributional issues were 
also taken into account. (Stern, p.55)
Stern frequently acknowledges that all such estimates 
are surrounded by great uncertainties. The projections 
have been challenged and need to be critically reviewed, 
but let us accept them as they are so that we can explore 
their implications.
Centrally we have two sets of forecasts: fi rst, projections 
of the likely cost of climate change over the next 200 
years, expressed as reductions in GDP as compared with 
the levels that might be assumed to arise under business 
as usual. Secondly, we have a set of projections of the 
possible cost of mitigation programmes designed to limit 
the extent of climate change.
The climate cost projections are generated through 
a Monte Carlo-type model in which all the more 
important uncertainties are represented by probability 
distributions quantifying the range of possible outcomes. 
The model, primed with some necessary exogenous 
assumptions, including rates of growth in population 
and per capita consumption, is then used to generate 
a sequence of runs in which, at each decision node, 
a random choice is made from amongst the relevant 
probability distributions. The results of 1,000 such 
runs are then summarised by their mean values and 
by the fi fth and 95th percentiles. Table 1 summarises 
Stern estimates of mean losses in income per capita, 
expressed as percentages of GDP, under two scenarios 
over the period to the year 2200. The numbers are 
read from Figure 6.5 at page 157 of the review and are 
approximate.
Three features stand out. First, the initial impacts of 
climate change are not all that great, amounting to 
reductions in per capita income of well under 1% in 
2050. The Stern models assume continuing increases in 
per capita income at 1.3% per annum, so that average 
per capita income is posited to be some 90% higher 
in 2050 than in 2000. Against this yardstick the early 
losses seem small.
Secondly, the forecast costs of climate change increase 
strongly during the 22nd century, refl ecting increases in 
greenhouse gas concentrations that will continue until 
such time as global emissions are brought back into 
balance with earth’s re-absorptive capacity.
Thirdly, the forecast costs of climate change increase 
in scenarios that assume higher temperature change, 
and increase further as the modelled range of possible 
effects increases.
The model runs incorporate constant rates of growth 
in population and per capita income. Given the scale of 
impacts that are being forecast, this assumption becomes 
increasingly more tenuous as time lengthens. Ideally, as 
the review acknowledges, these two variables should be 
forecast endogenously, within the model.
Note, in this connection, that much depends on the 
underlying rate of technical progress, particularly as it 
relates to the balance between output and environmental 
quality. Stern posits a production function where output 
is a function of capital, labour and environmental quality, 
),,()( ELKFtY =  (p.124). Given any level of technical 
innovation reducing environmental impact per unit of 
GDP, there is the potential for a parallel rate of growth 
in real incomes without damage to the environment. 
The twin challenges are to secure a suffi cient level of 
innovation and secondly to constrain the rate of growth 
in real consumption within that limit.
Testing sensitivity to discount rate
As noted earlier, Stern concludes that continuing 
expenditures equal to 1% of global GDP have the 
potential to limit greenhouse gas concentrations to 
acceptable levels. I use this judgement, along with the 
annual damage cost estimates read from Stern’s Figure 
6.5 as input to a 200-year cost-benefi t analysis which 
enables us to assess the sensitivity of comparisons 
2050 2100 2150 2200
Baseline 0.2 0.9 3.1 5.3
High Climate 0.5 2.9 8.3 13.8
Table 1: Losses in income per capita, % of GDP
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of these costs and benefi ts to differing discount rate 
assumptions.
Table 2 reports ratios of discounted time streams of 
climate costs and mitigation costs as projected by Stern. 
Ratios greater than 1.0 imply that the discounted present 
value of mitigation programmes is less than the similarly 
discounted value of the costs of climate damage resulting 
from business as usual. A ratio greater than 1.0 implies 
that, at the quoted discount rate, it would be sensible for 
society to undertake the mitigation programme rather 
than suffer the consequences of climate change.
As can be seen, the resulting ratios are greater than 
unity, over a 200-year time span, not only at a pure 
time preference discount rate of 0.1% and at the 1.4% 
rate used by Stern, but also at UK Treasury Green Book 
rates. But discount rates of 5% and 10% yield ratios 
less than unity.
Summing up to this point, the Stern Review projections 
of climate damage and mitigation costs establish a 
prima facie case for mitigation policies along the lines 
proposed not only when evaluated in terms of pure 
time preference, but also when discounted at rates 
corresponding to more commonly accepted values of 
social time preference rates.
The costs of business-as-usual climate 
change ‘now and forever’
When reporting modelled estimates of the costs of 
climate change, the Stern Review frequently refers to 
costs equivalent to some percentage of global per capita 
consumption ‘now and forever’. Thus, in relation to the 
high climate scenario, including non-market impacts, 
where Stern, at page 157, shows annual costs of damage 
rising from around zero in 2000 to 3% in 2100 and 
13.8% in 2200 (unweighted average value for the 200 
years less than 5%), Stern estimates total average cost 
‘now and forever’ of 14.4%. Whence the difference? The 
answer is provided in Stern’s Box 6.3, which explains 
that the utility projections include an allowance for 
growth in consumption from the year 2200 to infi nity. 
A substantial part of the assessed ‘now and forever’ cost 
lies beyond the year 2200.
This contrast highlights the problems inherent in 
long-range inter-generational comparisons of welfare. 
Enjoying my eighth decade and knowing that my 
grandchildren will be interested in the welfare of their 
grandchildren, I naturally incline to a longer view. I also 
recall William Blake’s musings on ‘dark Satanic mills’ 
in ‘England’s green and pleasant land’ just 200 years 
ago. Nevertheless, realism suggests that when it comes 
to translating distant fears into practical actions now, it 
will be diffi cult to sustain consensus for action on the 
scale required.
For example, the calculations underlying Table 2 show 
that the posited 1.0% of GDP spent on mitigation 
will need to be sustained over long periods before 
the discounted benefi ts, in terms of avoided climate 
damage, begin to exceed the discounted cost of the 
mitigation programme. Even at a discount rate of 0.1%, 
break-even is 93 years distant under the high climate 
scenario and 132 years distant under baseline. Adopt 
Green Book rules and these stretch out to 122 and 187 
years respectively. These are long periods to sustain a 
policy, particularly when the benefi ts of such a policy 
will always depend on a comparison of what actually 
is with the unknowable counter-factual of what might 
otherwise have been.
Setting a price on carbon
A central message of the Stern Review is the urgent 
need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, either by 
internalising the costs of emissions into the prices 
that we face when planning more or less greenhouse 
gas-intensive activities, or by regulation. The policy 
messages are that prices offer greater fl exibility and are 
likely to be more effi cient, but that they will need to be 
supplemented and indeed underwritten by regulation. 
Discount rate 0.1% 1.4% Green Book 5% 10%
Baseline 3.26 2.15 1.18 0.21 0.05
High Climate 8.67 5.80 3.19 0.58 0.12
Source: Author estimates. A supporting workbook is available from dennis.rose@clear.net.nz.
Table 2: Ratios of discounted climate and mitigation costs
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To be effective, both price and regulatory regimes need 
to be international in scope.
These will be public policy choices of a high order. They 
will involve trade-offs between costs at different points in 
time. To be effective they will also need to emerge from 
an ongoing debate that clarifi es the issues and builds 
suffi cient common understanding of the trade-offs 
involved to enable public choice to be made, sustained 
and modifi ed in the light of evolving circumstances and 
understandings.
The price of carbon provides an interesting illustration 
of the extent to which such choices are conditional on 
discounting assumptions.
Chapter 13 of the Stern Review, ‘Towards a goal for 
climate-change policy’, is concerned with establishing 
realistic targets for ultimate atmospheric concentrations 
of greenhouse gases, taking account of the trade-off 
between the costs of mitigation, which will be lower 
the less ambitious the target, and the costs of climate 
change, which will increase as the target is made less 
ambitious. Estimates of the cost of climate change and 
of mitigation are sensitive to discounting assumptions, 
as therefore is judgement on the implicit price of carbon 
emissions. Stern reviews the literature on estimates of 
the social cost of carbon and notes the sensitivity of such 
estimates to discounting assumptions.
In a 1996 article, William Nordhaus estimated 
that a shift from a 3% to a 1% discount rate would 
increase carbon taxes fourfold. He has now explored 
the sensitivity of carbon prices to discounting 
assumptions in model runs calibrated to match the 
Stern Review. Under a reference run of his DICE 
model using a 3% discount rate, the optimal carbon 
price is estimated at $17.12 per ton C, in 2005, rising 
to $84 in 2050 and $270 in 2100. Substituting a 
0.1% discount rate implies an optimal carbon price 
of $159 per ton C in 2005.
Conclusion
The Stern Review establishes a presumption in favour 
of strong collective action now but, at the same time, 
evidences ranges of uncertainty on many underlying 
facts and parameter values that will pose ongoing puzzles 
for researchers, policy makers and communities as they 
attempt to frame a response. Two concluding quotations 
are in order.
Nordhaus, in his 1996 paper, concluded:
[The] inherent diffi culties involved in planning 
over a horizon of a century or more about so 
uncertain and complex a phenomenon are 
compounded by the dispersed nature of the 
decisions and the strong tendency for free-riding 
by nonparticipants in any global agreement. 
Countries may therefore be triply persuaded not 
to undertake costly efforts today – fi rst because 
the benefi ts are so conjectural, secondly because 
they occur so far in the future, and third because 
no single country can have a signifi cant impact 
upon the pace of global warming. (Nordhaus 
and Yang, 1996, p.763)
Stern, discussing the economics of stabilisation, 
comments:
Some of the parameters that modellers have 
treated as uncertain, such as discount factors 
and equity weights, refl ect societies’ preferences. 
In the process of agreeing an international 
stabilisation objective, or at least narrowing its 
range, discussions have to resolve, or at least 
reduce disagreement over, the issues of social 
choice lying behind these uncertainties. (Stern, 
p.292)
The long-standing academic disagreements on discount 
rates suggest that this necessary opening up of the 
professional debate into public forums, so that we 
can all agree on the price at which we should tax our 
greenhouse gas emissions, is likely to have its fractious 
moments. Bon appetit.
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